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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 16, 2010, an oil pipe exploded in Dalian, People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), releasing oil into the nearby harbor and Yellow Sea.1 
The official report from the Chinese National Government was that 1500 
tons (400,000 gallons) of oil was released.2 Greenpeace China, however, 
estimated that it could have been as much as 60,000 tons of oil.3 At least 
one person died during cleanup efforts, wildlife was severely damaged, 
and Chinese fishermen lost an estimated $17 million USD in revenue 
because of contaminated waters.4 Just one week earlier, on July 10, 2010, 
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 1. Raymond Li, Fish Farmers Take Case to Beijing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 15, 2010, 
available at 2010 WLNR 18204675. 
 2. Id. 
 3. David Stanway, China Oil Spill Could be 60,000 Metric Tons: Greenpeace, REUTERS (July 
30, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/30/us-china-dalian-oil-idUSTRE66T2LQ201007 
30. 
 4. Dominique Doms, China Oil Spill Good Example for U.S. Plaintiffs, EXAMINER.COM (Sept. 
17, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/international-trade-in-national/china-oil-spill-good-example-
for-us-plaintiffs; see also Cara Anna, China Oil Spill Doubles in Size, Called ‘Severe Threat,’ 
MSNBC.COM (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38337393/ns/world_ 
news-world_environment/t/china-oil-spill-doubles-size-called-severe-threat/. 
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China’s new Tort Liability Law (TLL) went into effect.5 The National 
People’s Congress’s (NPC)6 Standing Committee (SCNPC)7 had passed 
the law on December 26, 2009.8 Articles 65 through 68 of the TLL out-
line specific provisions regarding liability for environmental pollution.9 
The TLL is an important step because for the first time a law “explicitly 
and formally addresses liability for environmental pollution.”10 “Moreo-
ver, this codification clarif[ies] ambiguities and benefit[s] plaintiffs.”11 
                                                            
 5. Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó qīnquán zérèn fǎ (中华人民共和国侵权责任) [The Tort Law 
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 
26, 2009) [hereinafter TLL], available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-12/26/content_1497435.htm, 
translated in LAWINFOCHINA, http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?Lib=law&Id=7846& 
keyword. 
 6. The National People’s Congress (NPC) is China’s primary national legislative body and 
functions as the “supreme organ of state power.” JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND 
TRANSFORMATION 113 (2008) (citation omitted). The NPC meets only once per year for several 
weeks at a time and is composed of nearly 3000 deputies who are elected for five-year terms. Id. 
Jianfu Chen summarizes the NPC’s role as follows: 
The powers of the NPC are provided by Articles 62 and 63 of the Chinese Constitution, 
and include the powers to revise the Constitution and to supervise its implementation, to 
make fundamental laws, to appoint and remove top government officials (including all 
officials at the rank of minister), to examine and approve government budgets and eco-
nomic and social development plans, and to supervise their implementation, and to exer-
cise all other (undefined) supreme powers of the state. The structures, functions and op-
erations of the NPC are governed by the Organic Law of the NPC (1982), the Procedural 
Rules of the NPC (1989), and the Law on Deputies of the NPC and the Local People’s 
Congress (1992). 
Id. at 114 (citation omitted). 
 7. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC) is defined in the Chi-
nese Constitution as the “permanent body of the NPC” and is granted “extensive powers.” Id. at 115. 
The SCNPC is composed of 175 members and has the power to 
interpret the Constitution and to supervise its implementation, to make laws and revise 
laws other than those that must be made by the NPC itself, to interpret laws, to examine 
and approve, when the NPC is not in session, partial adjustments to the plans for national 
economic and social development, and to the state budget that are necessitated during 
their implementation . . . . 
Id. 
 8. Adam Moser & Tseming Yang, Environmental Tort Litigation in China, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,895, 10,897 (2011). 
 9. TLL, supra note 5. Article 65 provides: “Where any harm is caused by environmental pollu-
tion, the polluter shall assume the tort liability.” Id. Article 66 provides: “Where any dispute arises 
over an environmental pollution, the polluter shall assume the burden to prove that it should not be 
liable or its liability could be mitigated under certain circumstances as provided for by law or to 
prove that there is no causation between its conduct and the harm.” Id. Article 67 provides: “Where 
the environmental pollution is caused by two or more polluters, the seriousness of liability of each 
polluter shall be determined according to the type of pollutant, volume of emission and other fac-
tors.” Id. Article 68 provides: “Where any harm is caused by environmental pollution for the fault of 
a third party, the victim may require compensation from either the polluter or the third party. After 
making compensation, the polluter shall be entitled to be reimbursed by the third party.” Id. 
 10. Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 8, at 10,897. 
 11. Id.  
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By enacting the TLL, the SCNPC has made two bold policy state-
ments. First, Article 1 of the General Provisions chapter sets forth the 
purpose of the TLL and states, “In order to protect the legitimate rights 
and interests of parties in civil relationships, clarify the tort liability, pre-
vent and punish tortious conduct, and promote the social harmony and 
stability, this Law is formulated.”12 Although China has followed the 
continental European civil law approach in the development of its laws,13 
the “punish” language in the TLL is a grand departure from one of the 
core principles of continental European civil tort law, where the purpose 
of tort law is to compensate a victim for his loss and to prevent future 
harm, but not to punish the violation.14 
Second, in addition to holding the polluter strictly liable under Ar-
ticle 65, the SCNPC drafted the environmental tort liability articles as a 
precautionary statute.15 Specifically, Article 66 states, “Where any dis-
                                                            
 12. TLL, supra note 5, ch. 1, art. 1 (emphasis added). The term “punishment” in the statute is a 
translation of the Chinese term zhicai (制裁). It is worth noting that the term could also be translated 
as “sanction,” and it is most commonly seen in conjunction with economic implications such as 
United Nations sanctions. Nevertheless, either translation retains a punitive connotation, and for the 
purposes of this Comment, I will use the term “punishment.” 
 13. Helmut Koziol & Yan Zhu, Background and Key Contents of the New Chinese Tort Liabili-
ty Law, 1 J. EUR. TORT L. 328, 329 (2010); see also George W. Conk, A New Tort Code Emerges in 
China: An Introduction to the Discussion with a Translation of Chapter 8—Tort Liability, of the 
Official Discussion Draft of the Proposed Revised Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China, 30 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 935, 935 (2007); YAN ZHU, INTRODUCING EUROPEAN LAW IN CHINA—FROM A 
COMPARATIVE ASPECT (2008), available at http://www.humboldt-foundation.de/pls/web/docs/F42 
79/zhu.pdf (noting that China follows the civil law tradition and borrows heavily from European 
Continental Law, in particular Germany). Each case decision is based solely on the interpretation of 
the code and stands on its own. Andrew J. Green, Tort Reform with Chinese Characteristics: To-
wards a “Harmonious Society” in the People’s Republic of China, 10 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 121, 
143 (2008). Thus, unlike the Anglo-American common law tradition, case decisions do not have 
precedential value. Id. 
 14. Koziol & Yan Zhu, supra note 13, at 336. Specifically, Koziol & Zhu note: 
[I]t seems very modern when [one] points out that tort law has a preventive function and 
aims to promote social harmony and stability. On the other hand, the rule deviates from 
common opinion in European civil law countries as it does not mention compensation as 
the main aim of tort law but stresses as a purpose of tort law the punishment of tortious 
acts. 
Id. United States tort theory follows this same principle—that the purpose of tort law is to compen-
sate a plaintiff in order to make him or her whole and prevent future harm, but not to punish the 
wrongdoer. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 6 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis 
added). 
 15. The precautionary principle is designed to prevent harm in the face of scientific uncertain-
ty. Robert V. Percival, Who’s Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 
22, 24 (2006); see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court in Ethyl 
summed up the precautionary principle best when it described it as follows: 
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, uncertain, or 
conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed 
to protect the public health, and the decision that of an expert administrator, we will not 
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pute arises over an environmental pollution, the polluter shall assume the 
burden to prove that it should not be liable or its liability could be miti-
gated under certain circumstances as provided for by law or to prove that 
there is no causation between its conduct and the harm.”16 Thus, rather 
than placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff in environmental tort 
cases, the TLL shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. This burden 
shift is a significant departure from the general rule of Chinese law, 
which places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove causation of 
damages based on the defendant’s act.17 
Although the SCNPC made a strong policy statement under Article 
1 that the goal of the TLL includes punishing tortious conduct, it pro-
vided for punitive damages for only products liability causes of action 
that arise under Article 47 of the Product Liability chapter.18 Punitive 
damages for environmental pollution torts were part of the discussions 
but were ultimately not included.19 Thus, the TLL does not identify a 
mechanism to enforce this stated purpose of punishing tortious conduct 
for environmental pollution torts.  
While burden shifting and strict liability will help citizens obtain 
redress for environmental pollution torts after they occur, the TLL can 
achieve its objectives of preventing environmental disasters and punish-
ing wrong-doers only if punitive damages are included as a remedy. In 
this Comment, I argue that to be effective, the environmental pollution 
torts provision of the TLL should be amended to include a punitive dam-
ages remedy because the stated purpose of the TLL is to prevent and pu-
nish, but the SCNCP did not identify a mechanism to achieve this stated 
purpose. In addition to providing a monetary remedy as an ex post facto 
retributive measure, the awarding of punitive damages serves as an ex 
ante deterrent. Because punitive damages were developed in the Anglo-
                                                                                                                                     
demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect. Such proof may be impossible to 
obtain if the precautionary purpose of the statute is to be served. 
Id.  
 16. TLL, supra note 5, art. 66 (emphasis added). 
 17. Mingqin You & Ke Huang, Annual Review of Chinese Environmental Law Developments: 
2009, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,484, 10,485 (2010). 
 18. TLL, supra note 5, art. 47. Article 47 provides: “Where a manufacturer or seller knowing 
any defect of a product continues to manufacture or sell the product and the defect causes a death or 
any serious damage to the health of another person, the victim shall be entitled to require the corres-
ponding punitive compensation.” Id. 
 19. Xu Hua (徐华), Qīnquán zérèn fǎ cǎo’àn zhōng chéngfá xìng péicháng zhìdù yánjiū 
(侵权责任法草案中惩罚性赔偿制度研究) [Punitive Damages in the Draft Tort Law], in Qīnquán 
zérèn fǎlǜ zhìdù bǐjiào yánjiū (侵权责任法律制度比较研究) [COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN TORT 
LAW] 70, 70–71 (Yóu Quànróng (游劝荣) ed. 2010). Also, prior to the enactment of the TLL, puni-
tive damages were not available in environmental pollution compensation cases. Alex Wang, The 
Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China: Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 
210 (2007). 
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American common law system, I base my analysis of punitive damages 
on U.S. tort theory and argue that China can draw from the U.S. expe-
rience in formulating a punitive damages scheme appropriate for torts 
caused by environmental pollution. 
There are three assumptions that must be considered in this Com-
ment. First, when referencing environmental torts where the underlying 
liability scheme is strict liability, I am referring only to torts caused by 
environmental pollution. In the American common law system, “envi-
ronmental torts” fall broadly into two categories—products liability and 
abnormally dangerous activities.20 The TLL separates environmental 
torts into three separate chapters: Chapter V, Product Liability; Chapter 
VIII, Liability for Environmental Pollution; and Chapter IX, Liability for 
Ultrahazardous Activity.21 Thus, the focus of this Comment is on Chap-
ter VIII, Liability for Environmental Pollution. Second, I premise this 
Comment on cases in which the polluter has violated environmental laws 
or regulations and is aware of those violations, but has continued to con-
duct activities that cause pollution. This Comment does not take into ac-
count cases in which a defendant has complied with environmental laws 
and regulations outside the TLL, but has nonetheless caused personal 
injuries due to polluting activities as this topic is beyond the scope of the 
arguments made here. Third, when making comparisons to U.S. tort law, 
I do not adhere to or distinguish between various modern tort theories.22 
In other words, my arguments do not fall into one specific category of 
modern American tort theory; rather, I pull salient ideas from multiple 
                                                            
 20. Nathan R. Hoffman, Comment, The Feasibility of Applying Strict-Liability Principles to 
Carbon Capture and Storage, 49 WASHBURN L. J. 527, 539 (2010). In the United States, the term 
environmental tort includes harms to a person, property, or the environment as a result of the “toxici-
ty of a product, a substance, or a process.” GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS 1 (2d ed. 2001). There are multiple theories of recovery for 
environmental torts, including negligence, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, tres-
pass, and nuisance. Id. at 4. The theory of recovery at issue in this Comment is strict liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). In its official 
comment d, the American Law Institute states in part: 
The defendant is held liable although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the 
harm to the plaintiff that has ensued. The liability arises out of the abnormal danger of the 
activity itself, and the risk that it creates, of harm to those in the vicinity. It is founded 
upon a policy of the law that imposes upon anyone who for his own purposes creates an 
abnormal risk of harm to his neighbors, the responsibility of relieving against that harm 
when it does in fact occur. The defendant’s enterprise, in other words, is required to pay 
its way by compensating for the harm it causes, because of its special, abnormal and dan-
gerous character. 
Id. § 519, cmt. d. 
 21. TLL, supra note 5. 
 22. The various modern tort theories include the following: social justice theory, civil recourse, 
and law and economics. For an overview of the various tort theories, see Michael L. Rustad, Torts as 
Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 1–17 (2011). 
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theories because each theory provides viable arguments relevant to the 
punitive damages discussion. 
This Comment proceeds in six parts. In Part II, I review China’s 
environmental, public health, and economic crises. In Part III, I examine 
that while China has had environmental laws and tort laws on the books, 
the laws are not enforced because of ambiguities in the law and efforts to 
protect local industry. Additionally, the Chinese have not historically 
favored litigation as a means of resolving disputes. In Part IV, I argue 
that the TLL offers the possibility of fixing these problems through its 
aggressive liability structure implementing strict liability and burden 
shifting. In Part V, I propose that in order to fulfill the TLL’s stated pur-
pose of preventing and punishing tortious conduct, the TLL must be 
amended to include the imposition of punitive damages. Punitive damag-
es are a great means of both empowering citizens and deterring environ-
mental tortfeasors from future misconduct. Further, I respond to the prin-
cipal counterarguments to my proposal. Finally, in Part VI, I conclude 
that imposing punitive damages is the appropriate mechanism to achieve 
the purpose set forth in the TLL. Punitive damages will not only provide 
a remedy for victims of environmental pollution torts but will also punish 
and deter polluters, thus having a net positive benefit on public health 
and the environment. 
II. CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS 
China’s economic boom has come at the expense of its environ-
ment.23 China is at a crossroads, and the practical reality calls for aggres-
sive reform. Some scholars argue that if China does not take aggressive 
measures, the consequences will be dire.24 Because of the massive eco-
nomic boom since the “reform and opening” (gaige kaifang),25 China has 
                                                            
 23. Robert V. Percival, The Challenge of Chinese Environmental Law, 10 INT’L ENVTL. L. 
COMM. NEWSLETTER 4 (Int’l Envtl. Law Comm., A.B.A. Section of Int’l Envtl. Law), Aug. 2008, 
http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/intenviron/newsletter/aug08/IELC_Aug08.pdf. 
 24. Alex Wang, The Downside of Growth: Law, Policy, and China’s Environmental Crisis, in 
2 PERSPECTIVES (Overseas Young Chinese Forum, 2000), available at http://oycf.org/Perspectives2/ 
8_103100/Contents.htm. 
 25. Id. The term “reform and opening” refers to the new era of political and economic thought 
beginning in 1978, when China opened its doors to the rest of the world after being isolated in the 
previous regime under Mao. See Wang Guiguo, The Legal System of China, in CHINESE LAW 1, 2–3 
(Wang Guiguo & John Mo eds., 1999). As Wang Guiguo notes, “Having been isolated from the rest 
of the world for several decades . . . China neither had the needed capital nor technology or man-
agement skills to revitalize its economy.” Id. at 3. The initial reform policies were implemented 
between 1978 and 1984. JIANFU CHEN, supra note 6, at 55. The reform and opening is a politico-
economic theory with pragmatic policies directed to attract foreign investment. Alex Wang, supra 
note 24, at 3. Included in the fabric of this political and economic reform was the “liberalization of 
legal thinking.” JIANFU CHEN, supra note 6, at 55. Under the “Two-Hands Policy,” the economy was 
to be developed on one hand, while the legal system was to be strengthened on the other. Id. at 51. 
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done in twenty years what it took the U.S. one hundred years to do.26 
Now, China faces environmental problems such as flooding, desertifica-
tion, water scarcity, and massive deforestation.27 Also, sixteen of the 
world’s twenty most polluted cities are in China,28 and 70% of China’s 
lakes and rivers are polluted.29 As noted by Alex Wang, China has fol-
lowed the “pollute first, control later” model of development like now-
developed countries30 and “economic development has invariably pre-
vailed.”31 The effect on the environment has been profound. 
China’s rapid economic growth has resulted in staggering damage 
to human health. For example, in 2007, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) estimated that 656,000 Chinese die annually as a result of air 
pollution.32 In addition, the WHO estimated that 100,000 Chinese die 
each year from polluted drinking water.33 Also, pesticides poison be-
                                                                                                                                     
Under the reform and opening, “[n]o country has moved up the economic ladder as quickly as Chi-
na.” PHILLIP STALLEY, FOREIGN FIRMS, INVESTMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (2010). A major thrust of the reform and opening has been for 
China to become open to foreign direct investment. Id. As noted by Stalley, “By 2007 China was 
receiving almost [$]75 billion in FDI per year.” Id. at 1–2. 
 26. Alex Wang, supra note 19, at 201. Additionally, Wang notes the following quote by the 
State Council in December 2005, when the State Council issued its Decision on Implementation of 
Scientific Development and Strengthening of Environmental Protection: 
The environmental situation remains extremely grim. Although environmental protection 
in China had made positive progress, the grim environmental situation has not 
changed . . . . Developed countries experienced environmental problems in stages along 
their 100 year industrialization process. China has seen all of these problems appear in a 
concentrated 20 year period . . . . Environmental pollution and ecosystem destruction 
have caused enormous economic losses, harmed the health of the masses, and affected 
societal stability and environmental safety . . . . 
At present, some places emphasize GDP growth and pay short shrift to environmental 
protection . . . . Environmental protection should be placed in a more significant strategic 
position. 
Id. 
 27. ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO 
CHINA’S FUTURE 9–10 (2004). 
 28. Patti Goldman, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in China: Lessons Learned from 
the U.S. Experience, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 251 (2007). 
 29. Id. at 251 n.2. Additionally, a 2005 statistic showed that 360 million Chinese lacked access 
to safe drinking water. Id. 
 30. Alex Wang, supra note 19, at 198. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Percival, supra note 23, at 3. 
 33. Id. These are just a few statistics. Elizabeth Economy provides a snapshot of the public 
health crisis plaguing China. The following are a few of the examples that she provides: (1) citizens 
living in the Zhejiang region are five to eight times more likely to die from intestinal cancer because 
of microcystin toxins; (2) citizens living in the Binzhou village in the Shandong province suffer from 
“brittle and cracking bones” because of contaminated water; (3) liver and esophageal cancer rates 
among citizens living in the Baiyangdian area south of Beijing are three times higher because of 
contaminated water; (4) those living in the suburbs of Beijing are in danger of high mercury because 
of the high level of mercury in the rice; and (5) those living in the zinc mining area in southern Chi-
na have higher rates of anemia and kidney and bone disorders because the rice and shellfish are 
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tween 53,311 and 123,000 Chinese annually.34 The World Bank esti-
mates that every year air pollution results in 6.8 million visits to the 
emergency room, 346,000 hospital admissions, and 178,000 premature 
deaths.35 Alex Wang summed up China’s public health crisis when he 
said the following: 
The numbers here are so uniformly large that they become a bit 
numbing; the numbers are too abstract in their largeness. Anyone 
who has ever been to China can attest to the very tangible ways in 
which environmental pollution reduces quality of life—the dank 
atmospheric haze, the way the air hurts the lungs and eyes, the way 
white shirts turn brown after a day outside.36 
Perhaps the most vivid story of the effects on human health is that 
of the Huai River. In the mid-1990s, numerous factories dumped their 
wastes directly into the river, producing a “toxic mix of ammonia and 
nitrogen compounds, potassium permanganate, and phenols” and causing 
massive contamination of the river.37 There was such heavy pollution 
that the river turned black, thousands of people were treated for illnesses, 
and nearly 26 million pounds of fish were killed.38 The water from the 
river flowed through irrigation channels.39 The pollution of the Huai has 
created “cancer villages,” and in some villages, the cancer rate is as high 
as 1-in-100.40 
In addition to the environmental and public health concerns, China 
also faces a growing economic crisis because of environmental degrada-
tion. For example, in 2003, there were eighty registered marine pollution 
incidences that polluted up to 90,262 hectares, causing an estimated loss 
of more than $354 million USD.41 In 1997, the World Bank estimated 
that total air and water pollution costs in China were $54 billion annual-
                                                                                                                                     
contaminated with cadmium. ECONOMY, supra note 27, at 84–85. Additionally, regarding the effects 
of poor air quality, Economy notes that “more than 60 percent of children in Shenzhen, 20 percent of 
children in Beijing, 50 percent of children in Shanghai, and 80 percent of children in Guangzhou 
were suffering from lead concentrations that exceeded levels considered safe by the WHO.” Id. 
Finally, Economy notes that the life expectancy for a traffic cop in Beijing is a mere forty years. Id. 
 34. ECONOMY, supra note 27, at 85. 
 35. Alex Wang, supra note 24, at 2. 
 36. Id. 
 37. ECONOMY, supra note 27, at 3–4. 
 38. Id. 
 39. China from the Inside: Shifting Nature (PBS television broadcast transcript 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.pbs.org/kqed/chinainside/pdf/pbschina-ep3.pdf. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Wang Canfa, Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies and Sug-
gested Reforms, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 159, 165 (2007). 
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ly—8% of China’s GDP.42 Even more shocking, the World Bank esti-
mates that health costs resulting from exposure to particulates alone will 
triple to $98 billion USD by the year 2020 unless aggressive action is 
taken.43 
III. CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL 
China has had environmental and tort laws on the books, but they 
have not achieved their stated goals, as shown by the ongoing stories of 
environmental and public health issues.44 The laws have been ineffective 
because Chinese laws are often ambiguous, and there is a widespread 
history of local protectionism. In addition, the Chinese have not tradi-
tionally used litigation as a means to resolve disputes and are even en-
couraged by the government to mediate at the outset of a dispute rather 
than litigate in a court of law. Thus, polluters often are not challenged in 
a court of law. 
In section A of this Part, I give a brief overview of China’s envi-
ronmental law system. In section B, I examine the problem of weak en-
forcement of environmental laws because of ambiguous legislation, weak 
administrative enforcement, and a weak court system. Finally, in section 
C, I review the historical preference for mediation in China. 
A. China’s Environmental Law System 
China has an extensive set of environmental laws and regulations.45 
As noted by one scholar, “China’s environmental protection regime . . . 
is comprised of approximately twenty laws, forty regulations, five hun-
dred standards, and six hundred other legal norm-creating documents 
related to environmental protection and pollution control.”46 In addition, 
                                                            
 42. ECONOMY, supra note 27, at 88. Some experts opine that when the water and air pollution 
statistics are combined with the problem of resource shortages, the portion of GDP increases to 12%. 
Id. 
 43. Id. at 89–90. 
 44. See Qun Du, The People’s Republic of China, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 411, 441–42 (Louis J. Kotzé & 
Alexander R. Paterson eds., 2009); see also Wang Canfa, supra note 41, at 164–79. In addition, 
other authors have argued for various legal reforms that could benefit environmental litigation as a 
whole. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 28, at 258–69 (arguing that one of the greatest impacts in 
making positive changes to U.S. environmental litigation was the recognition of citizen standing 
resulting from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), 
and that China could draw from the United States’ experience); see also Green, supra note 13, at 152 
(arguing that China should encourage class actions and that the adoption of contingency fees in civil 
litigation would encourage tort actions and give access to justice to more Chinese tort victims who 
would otherwise not be able to bring a suit because they cannot afford attorneys).  
 45. STALLEY, supra note 25, at 22. 
 46. Id. at 23. 
536 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:527 
there are approximately one thousand local environmental regulations.47 
Because China is a vast country, local governments tend to have a great 
deal of autonomy, which creates decentralization in law and policy.48 
China adopted its first environmental laws in 1979.49 It then passed 
the Law on Water Pollution Prevention and Control in 1984 and the Law 
on Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution in 1987.50 In 1989, 
China adopted the Environmental Protection Law, which is the “funda-
mental legislation” on environmental protection in China.51 China initial-
ly followed U.S. models of environmental law.52 But over time, China 
has leaned more heavily on the “precautionary principle” from the Euro-
pean approach.53 The present progress in environmental law in China has 
been likened to what occurred in the United States in the 1970s.54 
B. The Problem of Weak Enforcement 
The legal system in China has come under criticism “for its lack of 
transparency, ill-defined laws, weak enforcement capacity, and poorly 
trained advocates and judiciary.”55 In addition, the Chinese have shown a 
historic preference for mediation,56 and thus, more often than not, pollu-
ters do not have to defend themselves in court. 
1. Ambiguity in Legislation 
The laws often read like policy statements.57 Although China has 
extensive environmental laws on the books, the laws have been poorly 
                                                            
 47. Richard J. Ferris, Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, Reaching out to the Rule of Law: China’s Continu-
ing Efforts to Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 569, 
586 (2003). 
 48. STALLEY, supra note 25, at 28. 
 49. Lin Feng, Law on Environmental Protection, in CHINESE LAW, supra note 25, at 557, 560 
n.16; see also STALLEY, supra note 25, at 24 (showing historical chart of China’s primary environ-
mental protection laws). 
 50. STALLEY, supra note 25, at 3. 
 51. Lin Feng, supra note 49, at 560. This set of laws replaced the preexisting set of environ-
mental laws. Percival, supra note 23, at 3. 
 52. Percival, supra note 23, at 3. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 6. 
 55. ECONOMY, supra note 27, at 101. 
 56. Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years, 20 NW. J. 
INT’L. L. & BUS. 383, 387–88 (2000). 
 57. ECONOMY, supra note 27, at 101. Economy notes that “to many environmental protection 
officials and experts in both China and the West, most Chinese environmental protection laws are 
too broad, providing local officials with little guidance on implementation.” Id. As a specific exam-
ple, Economy cites to China’s Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law and excerpts a passage 
from an article by U.S. environmental law scholar John Nagle. There, Nagle states the following: 
China’s Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law states that “enterprises and other 
undertakings which cause serious water pollution must eliminate pollution within a stipu-
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enforced both administratively and judicially.58 Of the environmental 
claims that are brought to court, some are settled by administrative 
measures. Most claims, however, are not settled, resulting in “pollution 
victims suffering silently.”59 Additionally, although some citizens com-
plain to authorities, there is often no resolution.60 In 2005 alone, authori-
ties at the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA)61 received 
more than 50,000 complaints.62 But because of the lack of enforcement 
and because polluters are not hurt financially, there is no motivation for 
them to be in compliance, and they will continue to pollute.63 Elizabeth 
Economy calls this “conscious exploitation.”64 
2. Weak Administrative Enforcement 
Although China has a “relatively well-crafted environmental legal 
system,”65 there is a lack of administrative enforcement.66 Indeed, “bare-
ly ten percent of China’s environmental laws and regulations are actually 
enforced.”67 As noted in the previous section, the national agency empo-
wered to administer environmental regulations is the Ministry of Envi-
ronmental Protection (MEP) (formerly SEPA).68 The MEP has been de-
                                                                                                                                     
lated time.” What constitutes “serious” water pollution is not self-evident, nor is the 
meaning of “enterprises and other undertakings.” . . . The U.S. Clean Water Act, by con-
trast, specifies in much greater detail the type and amount of pollution that particular 
sources may emit through procedures for establishing effluent limitations and water qual-
ity standards and through the permit process. Additionally, the Clean Water Act compels 
any point source to obtain a permit stating the exact amount of each substance that may 
be discharged into water. 
Id. 
 58. Wang Canfa, supra note 41, at 174. 
 59. Yuhong Zhao, Environmental Dispute Resolution in China, 16 J. ENVTL. L. 157, 174 
(2004). 
 60. Id. 
 61. SEPA is China’s State Environmental Protection Agency and serves a regulatory function 
much like the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. STALLEY, supra note 25, at 28. In 2008, 
SEPA was elevated to ministry status and is now known as the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP). Id. 
 62. Wang Canfa, supra note 41, at 167. 
 63. Id. at 167–68. 
 64. ECONOMY, supra note 27, at 102. 
 65. CHARLES L. MCELWEE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CHINA: MITIGATING RISK AND 
ENSURING COMPLIANCE 30 (2011). 
 66. Wang Canfa, supra note 41, at 173. 
 67. Elizabeth Economy, The Great Leap Backward?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2007, at 
51. 
 68. MCELWEE, supra note 65, at 82–85. The MEP was originally established as the National 
Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) and had subministry level status. Alex Wang, supra note 
19, at 199 n.11. It was subsequently renamed the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), 
elevated and placed just under the State Council. Id. In 2008, it was renamed the Ministry of Envi-
ronmental Protection (MEP) and elevated again to ministry status. Id. Many see this promotion as a 
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scribed as a “relatively weak agency.”69 The MEP is ineffective because 
it is a tiny organization. As of 2007, the MEP (then SEPA) had only 219 
full-time professional staff in Beijing and approximately 2000 staff scat-
tered in other parts of the country for a population of several billion,70 
thus making it nearly impossible to regulate and monitor industry. 
Because the MEP is tiny, enforcement in China is left to the local 
Environmental Protections Bureaus (EPBs), which are understaffed and 
also subordinate to local government.71 Benjamin van Rooij argues that 
the “root of enforcement problems lies with the institutional arrange-
ment” that gives environmental enforcement authority to the local gov-
ernments.72 The EPBs “lack authority, administrative rank, and financial 
and human resources.”73 In addition, local officials place economic inter-
ests above environmental pollution enforcement.74 In some rural com-
munities, the local factory may be the primary source of tax revenue.75 
Thus, at the local level, environmental protection is regarded as an ob-
stacle. 
Another problem that leads to weak enforcement is that the fines 
that administrative agencies may impose are “very limited.”76 As former 
SEPA director Zhang Kunmin recently noted in an interview, it is like a 
“game of cat and mouse.”77 Polluters know when regulators are going to 
show up and turn on the pollution control equipment.78 But once the reg-
ulators are gone, they turn off the equipment and continue to pollute.79 
                                                                                                                                     
strong statement by China in favor of the environment. STALLEY, supra note 25, at 28. For an orga-
nizational chart showing the structure of the environmental protection system in China, see id. at 31. 
 69. Alex Wang, supra note 19, at 199 n.11. 
 70. By contrast, in 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) had nearly 
18,000 total employees across the country. Id. at 199 n.12. The U.S. EPA had a staff of almost 9000 
in Washington, D.C. alone. Economy, supra note 67, at 51. 
 71. MCELWEE, supra note 65, at 89–90. 
 72. Benjamin van Rooij & Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Fragile Convergence: Understanding Var-
iation in the Enforcement of China’s Industrial Pollution Law, 32 LAW & POL’Y 14, 15 (2010). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. Economy notes: 
Local governments also turn a blind eye to serious pollution problems out of self-interest. 
Officials sometimes have a direct financial stake in factories or personal relationships 
with their owners. And the local environmental protection bureaus tasked with guarding 
against such corruption must report to the local governments, making them easy targets 
for political pressure. 
Economy, supra note 67, at 52. 
 75. Rachel E. Stern, From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China, 206 CHINA Q. 294, 
298 (2011). 
 76. Meng Si, Seeking Damages, CHINA DIALOGUE (July 21, 2011), http://www.chinadialogue. 
net/article/show/single/en/4422-Seeking-damages. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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Zhang also notes that the fines for environmental pollution are not severe 
enough. Specifically, Zhang laments: 
With limited fines and low compensation, breaking the law is often 
cheaper than following it, and that further emboldens some irres-
ponsible firms. 
. . . . 
. . . That’s what happens when polluters don’t pay an appropriate 
price for the damage they cause and neither criminal or civil pu-
nishments follow. The costs of breaking the law are too low.80 
Thus, Chinese citizens often do not find recourse using administrative 
means because of the lack of enforcement. 
3. Weak Court System 
China has four levels of courts: Basic Courts, Intermediate Courts, 
Provincial High Courts, and the Supreme People’s Court.81 The judiciary 
has long been criticized as being ineffective and “institutionally weak.”82 
A longstanding problem with the judiciary is its lack of training.83 For 
example, prior to 2002, judges were not required to have a Bachelor’s 
degree.84 Additionally, prior to 2005, less than 50% of Chinese judges 
had university degrees.85 
Another longstanding problem with the judiciary is that it protects 
local industry. That is, local judges are often unwilling to enter a judg-
ment against a local company that provides substantial economic benefits 
to the local community.86 Additionally, because national laws tend to be 
broad and ambiguous,87 local judges find loopholes that benefit local in-
dustry.88 The problem of local protectionism is of such concern that the 
Supreme People’s Court even noted this issue as part of its analysis in a 
                                                            
 80. Id. 
 81. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 283 (2002). 
 82. Id. at 281. Peerenboom states, “Rule of law requires a judiciary that is independent, compe-
tent, and enjoys sufficient powers to resolve disputes fairly and impartially. China’s judiciary falls 
short on each of these three dimensions.” Id. at 280. Peerenboom also explains that “[a]s in some 
civil law countries, the courts are supposed to apply the law rather than make it or even interpret it.” 
Id. at 281. 
 83. See Benjamin Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 10–
18.  
 84. Id. at 12. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 16. 
 87. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 88. ECONOMY, supra note 27, at 102–03. 
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March 2010 high-court decision.89 In the context of environmental pollu-
tion cases, the courts have not met the standards expected by the citi-
zens.90 
Although the judiciary has been rife with problems, the Chinese 
government has taken measures to improve it.91 In 2001, the Supreme 
People’s Court announced its “century theme” to achieve “Impartiality 
and Efficiency” in the people’s courts.92 In March 2002, the President of 
the Supreme People’s Court announced at the Annual Conference of the 
National People’s Congress that the people’s courts would continue the 
ongoing judicial reform under the theme of impartiality and efficiency.93 
Over the past decade, “court reform” has been a major priority in Chi-
na.94 China now requires new judges to pass the national bar exam.95 Be-
tween 2000 and 2005, however, the bar passage rate by judges was a 
mere 10%.96 Thus, while China has focused on improving the judiciary, 
the courts are still seen as ineffective.97 
C. Mediation in China 
Mediation is relevant to the discussion of enforcement of environ-
mental laws in China because the focus on prelitigation mediation does 
not force polluters to defend themselves in court. Mediation, an intricate 
system with multiple tiers,98 has traditionally been the preferred means 
for resolving most civil disputes in China.99 The roots of seeking media-
                                                            
 89. In Zhao Ziwen v. Pan Riyang, No. 17 [2010] Civil Division I, Final, a property infringe-
ment case, the Supreme People’s Court concluded that a civil or commercial trial in which the 
amount in controversy is more than 50 million yuan (7.86 million USD) should be held outside the 
local courts to avoid local protectionism. Zhào ziwén yǔ pān rìyáng cáichǎn qīnquán jiūfēn àn 
(赵子文与潘日阳财产侵权纠纷案) [Zhao Ziwen v. Pan Riyang], 2010 Mín yī zhōng zì 17 
((2010)民一终字第17号), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (2010), available at http://www.lawinfo 
china.com/display.aspx?id=806&lib=case&SearchKeyword=Zhaoziwen&SearchCKeyword= (con-
sidering disputes over property Infringement).  
 90. Qun Du, supra note 44, at 440 (“The role of the people’s courts in environmental civil tort 
justice has lagged behind the public’s expectation of what it should or could be . . . . [I]t seems fair 
to conclude that the judiciary requires more time and experience . . . .”). 
 91. Mo Zhang & Paul J. Zwier, Burden of Proof: Developments in Modern Chinese Evidence 
Rules, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 419, 419 (2003). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Liebman, supra note 83, at 9. 
 95. Id. at 13. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 81, at 280–82. 
 98. Yuhong Zhao, supra note 59, at 158–73. Mediation is the primary method of resolving 
disputes in China. Id. at 161. Zhao explains that the levels of mediation fall into the following cate-
gories: people’s mediation; administrative mediation; judicial mediation; and extra-judicial media-
tion. Id at 158–73. 
 99. Lubman, supra note 56, at 387. 
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tion over litigation are deeply rooted in Confucianism,100 and historically, 
the Chinese have had a preference for “informal and non-adversarial 
means of dispute resolution.”101 Indeed, there is a Chinese proverb that 
states, “It is better to die of starvation than to become a thief; it is better 
to be vexed to death than to bring a lawsuit.”102 In addition, as noted by 
American legal scholar and American Law Institute member George 
Conk, “The Chinese approach departs from our often atomistic view of 
rights that emphasizes rights as either sword or shield, rather than as or-
ganically linked with responsibilities.”103 
Although mediation has historically been the preferred method of 
dispute resolution in China, litigation statistics over the past two decades 
show that the Chinese are embracing the rule of law and are now litigat-
ing in significantly greater numbers.104 One author explains that between 
1990 and 2002, there was a 144% increase from 1.8 million civil cases to 
4.4 million cases.105 As the Chinese embrace the rule of law and envi-
ronmental tort victims bring additional claims, there will be more pres-
sure on the judiciary to render justice and to refrain from local protec-
tionism. 
IV. THE TLL IS A PRECAUTIONARY STATUTE AND ITS STATED PURPOSE 
IS TO “PREVENT AND PUNISH” TORTIOUS CONDUCT 
With its aggressive strict liability and burden-shifting approach, the 
enactment of the TLL is an important step in the development of law in 
China. First, the TLL is the final set of laws after the Law of Contract 
and Law of Property in China’s development of a Civil Code.106 Second, 
the TLL is an additional recognition of individual civil rights for Chinese 
                                                            
 100. Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist 
China, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1284, 1290 (1967); see also J. Robert F. Utter, Dispute Resolution in China, 
62 WASH. L. REV. 383, 385 (1987) (describing “jang” in China, which translates to “yielding” and 
leads to compromise between the parties); Yuhong Zhao, supra note 59, at 161. Zhao explains, “The 
Confucian tradition emphasizes moral values and moral instructions as a basis for guiding behavior 
and maintaining social order. Law is not seen as a proper mechanism to shape human behaviour.” Id. 
In addition to this cultural reason for the Chinese preferring mediation over litigation, Zhao also 
offers that “the formal legal system has long been viewed by the Chinese Communist Party as a 
means to implement state policy, not for articulating and guaranteeing the individual’s rights.” Id. 
 101. ZHENG RUNGAO, ADR IN P.R. CHINA (2002), available at http://www.softic.or.jp/sym 
posium/open_materials/11th/en/RZheng.pdf. 
 102. Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 
1201, 1201 (1966). 
 103. Conk, supra note 13, at 940. 
 104. Yuhong Zhao, supra note 59, at 174. 
 105. Green, supra note 13, at 147–48. 
 106. Mingqin You & Ke Huang, supra note 17, at 10,485. 
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citizens.107 Third, using tort law to protect the environment has been a 
hot topic for many years in China.108 
Without a stronger enforcement mechanism, however, the TLL 
could fall into the same traps as past laws. Within the framework of envi-
ronmental tort litigation, punitive damages could play a vital role. In sec-
tion A of this Part, I give a brief overview of the TLL. In section B, I 
discuss the importance of the burden-shift provision in Article 66 of the 
Liability for Environmental Pollution chapter. In section C, I examine the 
prevention and punishment language in the introduction to the TLL. 
A. Brief Overview of the TLL 
The TLL consists of ninety-two articles broken into twelve chap-
ters.109 Article 1 of the General Provisions chapter sets forth the purpose 
of the law,110 and Article 15 of the Constituting Liability and Methods of 
Assuming Liability chapter sets forth the various remedies that can be 
sought.111 The provisions for Liability for Environmental Pollution are 
outlined in Articles 65 through 68 under Chapter VIII.112 Specifically, 
Article 65 provides that the environmental pollution tortfeasor will be 
held strictly liable.113 Article 66 provides that the burden of proof is on 
the defendant rather than the plaintiff.114 Article 67 provides for joint and 
several liability if there is more than one polluter.115 And Article 68 pro-
                                                            
 107. Long-awaited Civil Rights Law Gets Nod, LAWINFOCHINA (Dec. 29, 2009) (P.R.C.), 
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/News/News_Detail.asp?Id=7880 (last visited Feb. 13, 
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Zhengpeng noted, “It is one of the key laws within China’s legal framework of civil rights protec-
tion, reflecting a people-oriented society.” Draft Tort to Protect Civil Rights, LAWINFOCHINA (Dec. 
29, 2009) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/News/News_Detail.asp?Id=7878 (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 108. Mingqin You & Ke Huang, supra note 17, at 10,485. 
 109. TLL, supra note 5. The TLL chapters are as follows: Chapter I, General Provisions; Chap-
ter II, Constituting Liability and Methods of Assuming Liability; Chapter III, Circumstances to 
Waive Liability and Mitigate Liability; Chapter IV, Special Provisions on Tortfeasors; Chapter V, 
Product Liability; Chapter VI, Liability for Motor Vehicle Traffic Accident; Chapter VII, Liability 
for Medical Malpractice; Chapter VIII, Liability for Environmental Pollution; Chapter IX, Liability 
for Ultrahazardous Activity; Chapter X, Liability for Harm Caused by Domestic Animal; Chapter 
XI, Liability for Harm Caused by Object; and Chapter XII, Supplementary Provision. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. The remedies are set forth in Article 15 and consist of the following: (1) cessation of 
infringement; (2) removal of obstruction; (3) elimination of danger; (4) return of property; (5) resto-
ration to the original status; (6) compensation for losses; (7) apology; and (8) elimination of conse-
quences and restoration of reputation. Id. The remedy of punitive damages is not mentioned. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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vides that if a third party is at fault for the release of pollutants from a 
facility, then the injured party may bring an action against the third party 
or the facility.116 Additionally, the facility may bring an indemnity action 
against the third party.117 
Chinese environmental law scholar Yang Sujian argues that the 
new tort law resolves the prior conflict between provisions on environ-
mental tort liability provided by General Principles of Civil Law Article 
124 and Environmental Protection Law Article 41.118 Specifically, Yang 
argues that Article 124 of the General Principles of Civil Law and Article 
41 of the Environmental Protection Law were seemingly at odds.119 
While both laws provided recourse for victims of environmental torts, 
the laws differed on who had the burden of proof.120 Article 65 of the 
newly enacted TLL is consistent with the first paragraph of Article 41 of 
the Environmental Protection Law and resolves this apparent conflict in 
that it shifts the burden of proof to the polluter in environmental tort cas-
es.121 Next, Yang submits that Article 65 clarifies that a polluter can be 
found liable in tort even if it does not violate a separate environmental 
law or regulation as long as it causes harm.122 Thus, Yang argues that it 
should be easier for plaintiffs to bring tort claims for harms resulting 
from environmental pollution.123 
B. Shifting Burden of Proof Under Article 66 
Shifting the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant is 
based on the precautionary principle, a western European model of envi-
ronmental policy that is used to protect health and the environment when 
there is uncertainty about cause and effect.124 It originates from the early 
                                                            
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Yang Sujian, Qīnquán zérèn fǎ” duì huánjìng sùsòng yǒu hé zuòyòng? 
(《侵权责任法》对环境诉讼有何作用?) [How Does Tort Liability Law Affect Environmental 
Proceedings?], (Env’t & Natural Res. Law Research Inst. of China, Univ. of Political Sci. & Law), 
Jan. 7, 2010 (on file with author). Article 124 of the General Principles of Civil Law (enacted in 
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others in violation of state provisions for environmental protection and the prevention of pollution 
shall be subject to civil liability in accordance with the law.” Id. The first paragraph of Article 41 of 
the Environmental Protection Law (enacted in 1989) provides: “A unit that has caused an environ-
mental pollution hazard shall have the obligation to eliminate it and make compensation to the unit 
or individual that suffered direct losses.” Id.  
 119. Id. 
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 121. Id.; see also Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 8, at 10,897. 
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 123. Id. 
 124. Joel Tickner et al., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN ACTION: A HANDBOOK (1st ed. 
1998), available at http://www.biotech-info.net/handbook.pdf. 
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1970s and is based on the German principle of Vorsorge, which means 
foresight.125 The basic rationale of the precautionary principle is that 
“[t]hose who have the power, control, and resources to act and prevent 
harm should bear that responsibility.”126 Additionally, the precautionary 
principle encourages governments to address issues concerning human 
health and the environment in advance of science proving the causal 
link.127 
The TLL legislation is not the first time that China has used the 
burden-shifting principle. This principle is noted in Article 86 of China’s 
Solid Waste Pollution Control Law,128 enacted in 1996 and amended in 
2004, as well as in Article 87 of the Water Pollution Control Law, 
enacted in 1984 and amended in 1996 and 2008.129 Because it is difficult 
to prove causation in environmental tort cases, this shift alleviates pres-
sure on victims and places a heavy burden on defendants.130 Robert Per-
cival, a leading American environmental law scholar, argues that the 
common law liability for environmental torts is “too crude a vehicle to 
compensate those exposed to environmental hazards”131 and that China’s 
burden-shifting mechanism is a way to overcome the “causation conun-
drum,” which is a major hurdle in environmental tort law cases.132 
C. The Purpose of the TLL Under Article 1 is to “Prevent and Punish” 
Article 1 of the General Provisions chapter of the TLL states that in 
addition to promoting “social harmony and stability,” the purpose of the 
TLL is to “prevent and punish tortious conduct.”133 The TLL does not 
specifically address this purpose or reference back to Article 1 within the 
specific articles that follow the General Provisions chapter.134 Addition-
ally, the SCNPC did not provide any notes or comments regarding the 
TLL legislation.135 Thus, a critical issue going forward is that courts do 
not have a mechanism to enforce the punishment purpose set forth in 
Article 1 of the General Provisions. 
                                                            
 125. Id.; see also Percival, supra note 15, at 23. 
 126. Tickner et al., supra note 124, at 4. 
 127. Monique Lee Hawthorne, Comment, Confronting Toxic Work Exposure in China: The 
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V. CHINA SHOULD AMEND THE TLL TO ALLOW FOR THE REMEDY OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION CASES 
In this Part, I argue that China should amend the TLL to add a puni-
tive damages remedy for environmental pollution torts cases in which the 
polluter has knowledge that its activities does not meet environmental 
regulations yet continues to pollute. In section A, I provide an introduc-
tion to the proposal. In section B, I argue that the SCNPC should use Ar-
ticle 47 in the Products Liability section as its guide because Article 47 
addresses the “punish” language set forth in the purpose section of the 
TLL and provides an ex ante deterrent mechanism that is more effective 
than compensatory damages alone. In section C, I provide support for 
this proposal by arguing the following: (1) adding punitive damages 
would fix the lack of continuity between the stated purpose of the TLL 
and the environmental torts chapter; (2) the availability of criminal sanc-
tions as punishment in previous environmental laws has not sufficiently 
punished and deterred polluters; (3) allowing the remedy of punitive 
damages will encourage litigation and serve as a check on corporate pol-
luters; and (4) amending the already-existing TLL with a punitive dam-
ages provision for environmental pollution torts would be more efficient 
and more cost-effective than starting from scratch and drafting an envi-
ronmental compensation law. In section D, I recognize the potential re-
buttal arguments and respond to each. 
A. Introduction to Proposal 
Punitive damages are an effective means of empowering individual 
citizens by punishing and deterring tortious actors.136 Also, punitive 
damages are not mutually exclusive with strict liability systems.137 Al-
though the SCNPC relied heavily on continental European law in draft-
ing the TLL,138 the punishment language detailed in the General Provi-
sions falls under the Anglo-American tradition.139 While Article 47 under 
the Products Liability chapter expressly gives victims the right to claim 
punitive damages in a products liability tort action,140 Articles 65 through 
                                                            
 136. Rustad, supra note 22, at 461. 
 137. David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 54 MICH. L. REV. 
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68 of the Liability for Environmental Pollution chapter are silent regard-
ing punitive damages.141 Article 15, the remedies provision under the 
General Provisions chapter, is also silent regarding punitive damages.142 
Helmut Koziol and Yan Zhu are critical of the punishment language 
in the TLL.143 Specifically, Koziol and Zhu argue that punitive damages 
should not be awarded where the underlying theory of liability is strict 
liability and that “[m]entioning the goal of punishment increases the risk 
of accepting punitive damages . . . .”144 I take the opposite position and 
argue that the remedy of punitive damages is an appropriate tool and 
propose that because the TLL does not identify a mechanism to fulfill the 
punishment purpose of the TLL, the SCNPC should clarify the TLL’s 
purpose and amend the TLL to allow for punitive damages for environ-
mental pollution torts. 
B. The SCNPC Should Amend the TLL to Include Punitive Damages as a 
Remedy for Environmental Pollution Torts 
The SCNPC should amend the TLL to address how the prevention 
and punishment language in the General Provisions corresponds to the 
environmental tort liability articles.145 In clarifying how the prevention 
and punishment provision should apply to the environmental tort liability 
articles, the amendment by the SCNPC should apply the language from 
Article 47 of the Products Liability chapter to the language of the Liabili-
ty for Environmental Pollution chapter because the underlying liability 
scheme—strict liability—is the same.146 
As to the punitive damages remedy, Article 47 provides the follow-
ing: “Where a manufacturer or seller knowing any defect of a product 
continues to manufacture or sell the product and the defect causes a death 
or any serious damage to the health of another person, the victim shall be 
entitled to require the corresponding punitive compensation.”147 Thus, a 
                                                                                                                                     
serious damage to the health of another person, the victim shall be entitled to require the correspond-
ing punitive compensation.” Id. art. 47. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. art. 15. 
 143. Koziol & Yan Zhu, supra note 13, at 336. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Alternatively, the SCNPC or the Supreme People’s Court should consider issuing an 
interpretation regarding how the language of prevention and punishment in the general provision 
should correspond to the environmental tort liability provisions in Articles 65 through 68. For an 
overview of interpretive authority in China, see JIANFU CHEN, supra note 6, at 198–201. Because 
China follows the Civil Law Tradition and major judicial opinions do not carry precedential weight, 
the Supreme People’s Court often releases statements to advise the lower courts how certain laws 
should be interpreted. 
 146. See TLL, supra note 5, art. 47, Product Liability (“Where a defective product causes any 
harm to another person, the manufacturer shall assume the tort liability.”). 
 147. See TLL, supra note 5 (emphasis added). 
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manufacturer’s knowledge plus a failure to act allows for the imposition 
of punitive damages.148 
This equation is similar to how the courts in the U.S. have inter-
preted the failure to act, which gives rise to the imposition of punitive 
damages in strict liability cases.149 In determining whether there is liabili-
ty for punitive damages in tort actions under U.S. law, American legal 
scholar Gerald W. Boston has stated, 
[T]he essential tests boil down to two basic groupings: (1) punitive 
liability based on express malice, ill will, or intent to cause harm to 
the plaintiff; and (2) recklessness, the creation of a high probability 
of harm to others when the defendant knows or has reason to know 
of the risk and remains consciously or flagrantly indifferent to the 
risk.150 
Boston has further noted that for strict liability cases, the appropriate 
grouping is the second. The “knowledge” plus “continuance” formula set 
forth in the TLL Article 47 aligns most closely with the “conscious-
ly . . . indifferent” language of Boston’s second set of criteria. 
Imposing punitive damages will encourage attorneys and citizens to 
bring more lawsuits. The fear of litigation and the potential for punitive 
damages will give citizens a voice, punish polluters, and deter future pol-
luting activities.151 
C. Support for Proposal 
1. Lack of Continuity in Statutory Language 
A lack of continuity exists between the stated purpose of the law to 
“prevent and punish” and the specific guiding statutory language in the 
Liability for Environmental Pollution Torts chapter: the TLL as written 
does not provide a mechanism to punish and deter polluters. This lack of 
continuity between the stated purpose of the law and the specific articles 
fulfilling that purpose is representative of what leading Chinese envi-
ronmental expert and advocate Professor Wang Canfa (Professor Wang) 
calls “superficial” legislation.152 Professor Wang notes that Chinese leg-
                                                            
 148. Id. 
 149. GERALD W. BOSTON, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN TORT LAW, Part II, ch. 19, 25 (1993). 
 150. Id. at 25. 
 151. Rustad, supra note 22, at 461. Rustad argues that tort law “serves a public purpose beyond 
those of the immediate parties to the lawsuit.” Id. He further argues, “[O]nly punitive damages can 
establish that ‘tort does not pay’ by hitting the rich and powerful in the bank account.” Id. 
 152. Wang Canfa, supra note 41, at 170. 
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islation is sometimes “presented in an attempt to meet international 
trends and results in superficial influence.”153 He further states, 
[W]ith this frivolous legislation comes an emphasis on substantial, 
subject-driven legislation, ignoring the needed procedural and im-
plementation mechanisms. There are many substantial environmen-
tal laws in China with inadequate procedural laws. These laws con-
tain many general provisions with a few liability provisions, incor-
porating small fines that do not deter violations.154 
From this statement, Professor Wang recognizes that the environmental 
laws in China lack an appropriate deterrent mechanism. 
2. Criminal Sanctions Have Not Adequately Punished and Deterred 
In 1997, China amended its criminal law and made major changes 
in its special provisions.155 Articles 338 to 346 define environmental 
crimes,156 and of particular importance in the context of environmental 
pollution by industrial facilities are Articles 338 and 339. Article 338 
covers violations for the “discharge, dumping, or treating of radioactive 
waste . . . toxic substances, or other hazardous waste on land or into the 
water bodies or the atmosphere.157 
Article 339 covers violations for dumping, storing, or processing 
solid waste from abroad in China in violation of state regulations.158 
                                                            
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. (internal citations omitted & emphasis added). 
 155. Gu Minkang, Criminal Law, in CHINESE LAW, supra note 25, at 606. 
 156. MCELWEE, supra note 65, at 249–51. Specifically, Article 338 provides: 
Whoever releases, dumps, or disposes of radioactive wastes, wastes containing pathogen 
of contagious diseases, and toxic materials or other dangerous wastes into land, water, 
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Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó xíngfǎ (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s Repub-
lic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 14, 1997, effec-
tive Oct. 10, 1997), art. 338 [hereinafter Chinese Criminal Law], translated in LAWINFOCHINA, 
available at www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=354. 
 157. Gu Minkang, supra note 155, at 631. 
 158. Id.; MCELWEE, supra note 65, at 249. Specifically, Article 339 provides: 
Those who dump, store or process solid waste from abroad in the country in violation of 
state regulations are to be sentenced to not more than five years of fixed-term imprison-
ment or criminal detention, and in addition be sentenced to a fine. Those whose acts 
cause serious environmental pollution and major damages to public or private properties 
or seriously endanger people’s health are to be punished by sentence of not less than five 
years and not more than 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment, and in addition be sen-
tenced to a fine. Those whose acts have especially serious consequences are to be sen-
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Criminal fines or imprisonment are available depending on the severity 
of the crime.159 In addition, in 2006, the Supreme People’s Court issued 
an interpretation “setting a relatively low threshold for the application of 
Articles 338 and 339 in the case of ‘major environmental pollution acci-
dents.’”160 
But Articles 338 and 339 have been inadequate in punishing and 
deterring polluters. Professor Wang notes that for the years 1998 to 2002, 
for example, of the 387 serious environmental accidents deserving crimi-
nal punishment, less than twenty cases were prosecuted.161 Thus, if the 
laws providing punishment for environmental crimes are not working 
and the purpose of the TLL is to prevent and punish tortious conduct, the 
imposition of punitive damages in environmental tort litigation could 
provide a viable alternative for punishing polluters. 
3. Punitive Damages Will Encourage Litigation 
Bringing a lawsuit is costly.162 Additionally, many pollution victims 
are unaware of their rights.163 To help overcome these hurdles, punitive 
damages in environmental pollution cases should be allowed to incentiv-
ize citizens to bring lawsuits against polluters. 
Chinese legal scholar Yuhong Zhao argues that civil environmental 
litigation serves an essential function in the dispute resolution process 
and has three positive effects.164 First, it helps improve environmental 
law-making. Zhao notes that legislation is “at best imprecise” and “often 
contain[s] ambiguities, irreconcilable provisions and indefinite stan-
dards.”165 Significantly, Zhao offers that “litigation produces far more 
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 159. MCELWEE, supra note 65, at 249. 
 160. Id. at 250. 
 161. Wang Canfa, supra note 41, at 168. Additionally, Stalley notes that “to date it is still 
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 162. Yan Weijun (闫卫军), È lùn wǒguó qīnquán zérèn fǎ yǐnrù chéngfá xìng péicháng zhìdù 
de bìyào xìng (略论我国侵权责任法引入惩罚性赔偿制度的必要性) [On the Importance of Intro-
ducing Punitive Damages into our Tort Law System], in Qīnquán zérèn fǎlǜ zhìdù bǐjiào yánjiū 
(侵权责任法律制度比较研究) [COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN TORT LAW], 66, 69 (Yóu Quànróng 
(游劝荣) ed., 2010). 
 163. Chen Danyan (陈丹艳), Qiǎn tán zài wǒguó qīnquán fǎ zhōng shèlì chéngfá xìng 
péicháng zhìdù (浅谈在我国侵权法中设立惩罚性赔偿制) [On the Establishment of Punitive Dam-
ages in our Tort Law], in Qīnquán zérèn fǎlǜ zhìdù bǐjiào yánjiū (侵权责任法律制度比较研究) 
[COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN TORT LAW], 80, 80 (Yóu Quànróng (游劝荣) ed., 2010). 
 164. Yuhong Zhao, supra note 59, at 174. 
 165. Id. 
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significant impact than conciliation or mediation on the society as a 
whole, but especially on policy makers, by exposing openly and substan-
tively the defects or problems of existing environmental law and its im-
plementation.”166 Alex Wang echoes Zhao and offers that lawsuits “put 
the spotlight on gaps in legislation and drive legal reform.”167 
Second, litigation “creates ripple effects that help rais[e] public 
awareness.”168 When the media reports stories of pollution victims being 
compensated through the judicial process, other victims will pursue liti-
gation because they are then aware of their environmental rights.169 
Third, litigation puts pressure on the polluting industry. Zhao ar-
gues that until the costs can be shifted from the victims of pollution to 
the polluters through litigation, the industry will not take pollution pre-
vention seriously.170 Specifically, Zhao states that most in the industry 
are “not serious about the consequence of their polluting activities be-
cause the current legal mechanisms do not seem to hold them fully liable 
for the pollution caused and the resultant loss suffered by the victims.”171 
Within the framework of litigation, allowing for the remedy of punitive 
damages would encourage more citizens to bring suits, thus holding in-
dustry accountable for pollution prevention and regulating corporate be-
havior.172 
Moreover, litigation gives the masses a voice: it provides an outlet 
for people to seek redress for harms caused and helps alleviate the poten-
tial for social unrest. Environmental problems have led to greater social 
unrest, which has been an issue of concern in China. According to Alex 
Wang, there were 50,000 disputes over environmental issues in 2005 
alone.173 Additionally, “[f]rom 2001 to 2005, Chinese environmental au-
thorities received more than 2.53 million letters and 430,000 visits from 
597,000 petitioners seeking environmental redress.”174 In certain cases, 
citizens have taken to the streets and some protests have turned vio-
lent.175 For example, in 2005, in the Zhejiang Province, some 30,000 to 
40,000 villagers “swarmed 13 chemical plants, broke windows and over-
turned buses, attacked government officials, and torched police cars.”176 
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In addition to making tort victims whole for harm suffered, envi-
ronmental tort litigation achieves a broader social goal of impacting the 
behavior of polluters by putting pressure on them to cease polluting ac-
tivities or to innovate with new technologies that lessen harm to human 
health. The pressure from litigation ultimately has a net positive impact 
on the environment. Thus, environmental tort litigation not only achieves 
China’s purpose of recognizing individual rights but it also has a positive 
impact on the environment. 
Litigation statistics show that Chinese citizens are litigating in 
greater numbers. Specifically, the number of environmental tort claims 
has been increasing 25% each year.177 These statistics show that the Chi-
nese want to use litigation as a tool to seek redress for environmental 
wrongs. 
4. Efficiency of Amending the TLL 
It would be costly and inefficient to require the SCNPC to draft en-
tirely new procedures that implement more effective deterrent mechan-
isms. But amending the TLL to allow for punitive damages in environ-
mental pollution cases would give judges a straightforward mechanism 
in which to administer justice to victims of environmental pollution. 
There has been discussion among legal scholars in China to legislate a 
specific environmental compensation law.178 That process, however, 
could take years. Former MEP leader Zhang claims that it would take ten 
years to draft an environmental compensation law.179 Furthermore, when 
polluters are punished and have to pay punitive damages, they will be 
deterred from polluting in the future and will be forced to innovate in 
order to curb future pollution. Ultimately, imposing punitive damages 
will provide a remedy for victims of environmental pollution torts and 
also improve the environment. 
D. Response to Potential Counterarguments Against Allowing Punitive 
Damages in Strict Liability Cases 
The majority of legal theorists, in both continental Europe and the 
U.S., speak against allowing punitive damages in cases of strict liabili-
ty.180 Specifically, the punishment and prevention language of the gener-
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 178. Meng Si, supra note 76. 
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al provisions in the TLL raised concerns from Helmut Koziol and Yan 
Zhu. In their article, Background and Key Contents of the New Chinese 
Tort Liability Law, Koziol and Yan Zhu warned that the general provi-
sions should have emphasized that “compensation should be the basic 
aim of tort law in order to avoid potential misunderstanding and contro-
versies”181 and that “[m]entioning the goal of punishment increases the 
risk of accepting punitive damages and this should be avoided as quite a 
number of weighty arguments speak out against them.”182 In particular, 
they spoke against punitive damages where there is a strict liability 
scheme.183 
The primary theoretical argument against allowing punitive damag-
es in a strict liability claim is that strict liability and punitive damages are 
“incompatible.”184 Central to the incompatibility argument is the notion 
that imposing punitive damages is not appropriate because the theory of 
strict liability is not fault-based.185 Opponents argue that while misbeha-
vior is not a prerequisite to the finding of guilt under strict liability, the 
imposition of punitive damages relies on the guilty party’s misbehavior; 
thus, punitive damages as a remedy for tortious conduct fits more square-
ly under negligence principles.186 
But American legal scholar David G. Owen rebuts the incompati-
bility argument and argues that punitive damages are an appropriate legal 
tool in strict liability tort cases, especially in the case of intentional or 
reckless conduct.187 While he writes in the context of products liability 
litigation, he readily notes that this rationale can be applied to other 
causes of action, including nuisance, trespass to land, and ultra-
hazardous activities. Owen’s thesis is that strict liability deals appro-
priately with the “innocent” manufacturer because “liability is imposed 
even though the manufacturer has exercised due care.”188 He also argues 
                                                                                                                                     
of punitive damages is predicated on culpability, intent, or recklessness); see also Mark A. Geistfeld, 
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that “the principles of strict liability are ill-equipped to deal with prob-
lems at the other end of the culpability scale” when the manufacturer is 
intentional or reckless regarding consumer safety.189 Owen argues that 
the appropriate legal tool to combat this second scenario is the punitive 
damages remedy.190 
To support his thesis, Owen offers two primary supporting points. 
First, he argues that strict liability tort theory is not a delimiting factor on 
other remedies that might be available if the manufacturer is shown to 
have acted with aggravated fault.191 Second, Owen argues that the in-
compatibility argument is premised on the faulty assumption that the 
claim for punitive damages must be established by facts “identical to 
those supporting the underlying claim for compensatory damages.”192 
Gerald Boston echoes Owen’s arguments, submitting that “[t]he reason 
why punitive damages are recoverable in strict liability cases is because 
the availability of punitive damages does not turn on the essential charac-
ter or nature of the underlying tort.”193 
Additionally, in contrast to what legal theorists have opined, U.S. 
courts have generally upheld punitive damage awards in the context of 
strict products liability cases.194 Indeed, Boston argues that in the context 
of products liability “the majority of courts have held that punitive dam-
ages may be recovered when the plaintiff’s underlying claim is founded 
on strict liability.”195 Courts have also upheld punitive damages in envi-
ronmental pollution cases in which strict liability is the underlying theory 
of liability. 196 
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus-
tries, an asbestos case, summarized this argument best: 
Punitive damages may be assessed against the manufacturer of a 
product injuring the plaintiff if the injury is attributable to conduct 
that reflects reckless disregard for the public safety. “Reckless dis-
regard” is not to be confused with inadvertent conduct. To meet this 
standard the manufacturer must either be aware of, or culpably in-
different to, an unnecessary risk of injury. Awareness should be im-
puted to a company to the extent that its employee[s] possess such 
information. Knowing of this risk, the manufacturer must also fail 
to determine the gravity of the danger or fail to reduce the risk to an 
acceptable minimal level. “Disregard for the public safety” reflects 
a basic disrespect for the interests of others.197 
Thus, a company’s failure to act when it has knowledge that its risky ac-
tivities will cause harm is the critical factor in allowing punitive damages 
in strict liability actions.   
Second, opponents argue that imposing punitive damages unjustifi-
ably awards the plaintiff with a windfall.198 This argument goes as fol-
lows: if a company is forced to pay exemplary damages above and 
beyond compensatory damages to one plaintiff, then subsequent plain-
tiffs will not be compensated for their injuries.199 
China, however, could identify a creative solution to overcome 
what some perceive as a windfall. First, it could take the punitive award 
and create a trust for restoration or compensation. Second, since en-
forcement at the administrative level has been criticized as ineffective, 
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China could give the punitive award to the MEP or EPBs to assist with 
administrative enforcement of environmental regulations. 
Third, opponents argue that under strict liability, the plaintiff has al-
ready been made whole by compensatory damages. Mitchell Polinsky 
and Steven Shavell argue that under strict liability, damages should equal 
harm, and thus, punitive damages are inappropriate because they over-
compensate.200 Specifically, they opine that “various socially undesirable 
consequences will result” if a defendant does not pay damages that are 
equal to the harm that the defendant has caused.201 Damages should equal 
harm caused because potential injurers will, in theory, have socially cor-
rect incentives to take precautions.202  
But Polinsky and Shavell’s examples and explanations fail to rec-
ognize the special harm in environmental pollution cases. Specifically, 
their argument does not take into account the effects of pollution on natu-
ral resources and the significant costs that result from pollution—both for 
remedial efforts and public health problems. Missing in their calculation 
are the permanent costs to human health and the environment. Addition-
ally, as noted earlier in this Comment, China faces an extraordinary fi-
nancial burden to deal with environmental harms.203 
Fourth, legal theorists and commentators argue that punitive dam-
ages allow for runaway awards that could bankrupt a particular industrial 
defendant. This argument is of particular importance in the context of 
China because China has generally placed economic development ahead 
of the environment with a “pollute now, pay later” mentality.204 
China, however, could resolve this issue by instituting a cap with a 
single-digit ratio, similar to how the U.S. Supreme Court has shaped lim-
its on punitive damage awards in the U.S.205 The idea of caps was dis-
cussed during the legislative process of the TLL.206 Xu Hua argues that 
punitive damages should equal double the compensatory damages.207 
                                                            
 200. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 180, at 877–83. 
 201. Id. at 878. 
 202. Id. at 879. 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 41–43. 
 204. STALLEY, supra note 25, at 38–40. 
 205. In BMW of North Dakota, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1997), the Court held that punitive 
damage awards should be subject to three guideposts: (1) degree of reprehensibility; (2) the ratio of 
the amount of the punitive damage award to the damage suffered; and (3) consideration of civil 
penalties that could be enforced for the defendant’s conduct. Subsequent to Gore, in State Farm 
Mutual Auto Insurance v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), the Court built on the Gore decision and 
held that punitive damages awards should be only in a single-digit ratio to the compensatory damag-
es awarded. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), the Court affirmed its holding in 
State Farm by limiting the damages in the context of environmental tort action to a single-digit ratio. 
 206. Xu Hua, supra note 19, at 73. 
 207. Id. 
556 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:527 
Moreover, all trials in China are bench trials.208 Thus, the fear of runa-
way punitive damage awards by over-sympathetic juries would not be a 
concern in China. 
Finally, American legal scholar Kip Viscusi argues that punitive 
damages do not have a deterrent effect and do not accomplish the goal of 
efficient deterrence in environmental and safety cases.209 Specifically, 
punitive damages are not needed for deterrence, and compensatory dam-
ages are generally adequate for deterrence.210 Government regulation 
provides additional incentives for safety.211 
But Viscusi recognizes an exception to his argument, noting that 
punitive damages can be effective deterrent measures when there are en-
forcement errors.212 The enforcement error exception is of particular re-
levance to China. As noted earlier in this Comment, the principle prob-
lem in China’s environmental protection regime is the lack of enforce-
ment of environmental statutes.213 Although a complex set of environ-
mental laws exist, they are not properly enforced.214 
Because of the poor implementation and enforcement of other envi-
ronmental legislation, tort law could be used as a means to benefit Chi-
nese society. An amendment is a simpler, straightforward way of giving 
local judges the tools they need to administer justice. Not only will the 
administration of justice remedy victims of tort but it will also have a 
positive impact on the environment. 
In sum, China must consider amending the TLL to address the pu-
nishment and prevention purpose in the general provisions of the TLL. If 
industry fears the imposition of punitive and preventative measures, it 
will be less inclined to pollute. Not only will this decrease in pollution 
improve human health but it will also have a residual effect on the envi-
ronment as a whole. Additionally, by addressing environmental con-
cerns, China will benefit economically in the long run because future 
costs associated with environmental harm will decrease. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By enacting the TLL, the SCNPC has put into place national laws 
for victims of environmental torts to seek recovery. The TLL is an ag-
gressively written statute because it implements strict liability and bur-
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den shifting and its stated purpose is to prevent and punish tortious con-
duct. But as currently written, the TLL does not provide a mechanism to 
achieve its stated purpose to punish. In order to achieve this stated pur-
pose, the SCNPC should amend the TLL to include the remedy of puni-
tive damages in environmental pollution cases. In drafting the amend-
ment, the SCNPC should model the punitive damages remedy on Article 
47 of the Product Liability chapter because the “knowledge” plus “conti-
nuance” formula set forth in Article 47 reflects the appropriate punish-
ment mechanism that also can be applied to environmental pollution cas-
es. 
The recent Dalian oil spill is an example of how Chinese citizens 
seeking compensation for environmental torts still have to overcome bar-
riers to justice even though the SCNPC has enacted laws to protect them. 
Claims for damages related to the spill face political, administrative, and 
legal challenges.215 In September 2010, two months after the spill, a Bei-
jing attorney noted in an interview that China has provisions in place for 
compensation for environmental torts.216 He went on to state the follow-
ing: “Our state-owned companies are spoiled over and over again by the 
government. They unabashedly transfer huge environmental costs to so-
ciety . . . . Ordinary people are like a small skiff in the ocean against the 
aircraft carrier PetroChina.”217 
The ultimate success of the TLL depends on the use of the punitive 
damages remedy. While China has made great strides toward using the 
law to control harmful behaviors and empower citizens, the SCNPC 
could make an even stronger statement by amending the TLL to include 
the remedy of punitive damages for environmental pollution torts. As 
noted previously in this Comment, one of the major reasons that China 
faces an environmental and public health crisis is that environmental 
laws and regulations are not properly enforced. Polluters who ignore 
laws and regulations must be held accountable. By amending the TLL, 
the SCNPC could meet its goal of punishing polluters by allowing for 
punitive damages in cases in which the polluter has knowledge of its pol-
luting activities but continues to pollute and disregards the harm created 
to others. Ultimately, allowing punitive damages in environmental pollu-
tion cases under the TLL is one step that could have a major impact in 
providing justice for victims of environmental pollution torts. 
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